

Work and Welfare: Towards a Post-productivist Welfare Regime.

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Among the many ways in which welfare regimes differ, one is how they articulate the demands of work and welfare. Such a framework not only renders more coherent the familiar 'three worlds of welfare capitalism' but also highlights another option: a 'post-productivist' welfare regime, which combines generous social benefits and a relaxed attitude towards work requirements, aiming at 'autonomy' as its core value. Analysis of OECD data circa 1993 shows that a work-welfare classification successfully locates most of the countries in their traditional regime types. It also shows the Netherlands as an instance of the new regime type, effectively promoting the three key components of post-productivist autonomy: income adequacy, temporal adequacy and minimal conditionality.

Different welfare regimes differ in many important respects. One which has come to recent prominence, among welfare theorists and practitioners alike, is the way in which they articulate the demands of work and welfare. [1] Liberals rally to the slogan, 'Work, not welfare'. Under a liberal welfare regime, people are supposed to earn their living on the labour market, and public welfare programmes are supposed to serve only as a residual fall-back. [2] The corporatist slogan is, 'Welfare through work'. This is Titmuss's 'industrial achievement' model, wherein a family's welfare entitlements are based on workplace contributions that the (typically male) breadwinner and his employer have made to the social insurance scheme throughout his working life. [3] The social democratic slogan is, 'Welfare and work'. Under a social democratic regime, welfare benefits are treated as citizens' rights; but citizens have a corresponding responsibility to make productive contributions whenever they reasonably can, and social democratic governments adopt 'active labour market policies' to help them do so. [4]

Importantly different though all of those approaches are, equally important is what they all have in common. They are all essentially 'productivist'. [5] They are all centrally concerned to ensure a smooth supply of labour to the productive sectors of the formal economy, and they are all anxious that the welfare state not get too badly in the way of that. In terms of an aphorism standardly presented as a plain truth of a priori logic, 'Without work there can be no welfare.' If no one produces anything, there will be nothing for

government to redistribute to anyone. It would be simply self-defeating for government, in pursuit of social welfare objectives, to undermine the productive sector of the economy too badly. [6]

Of course, no welfare regime -- not even the liberal one -- accords absolute priority to economic productivity in the 'equity--efficiency tradeoff'. [7] Still, all the standard models of the welfare state see economic productivity as a great constraint to be reckoned with. They are all sensitive to the 'productivist problematic' in that sense. They all must, in one way or another, reassure themselves that productivity will not be too badly undermined by their social welfare policies.

Another broad class of 'post-productivist' models would take a fundamentally different attitude towards work and welfare. [8] Their slogan (in hyperbolic form, as slogans inevitably are) might be, 'Welfare without work.' [9] Under a post-productivist welfare regime, as under a social democratic one, people's welfare entitlements would be strictly independent of their participation in paid labour. [10] But unlike social democrats, post-productivists would make no extraordinary efforts to get people into work alongside that. [11]

Post-productivists would take a relatively relaxed attitude to relatively large numbers of people drawing welfare cheques rather than pay cheques for relatively protracted periods. Of course, not everyone could do so. Like everyone else, post-productivists need enough people to work in the productive sectors of the economy to finance public transfers to those not. Post-productivists are not anti-productivists. Their point is simply that economic productivity can be sustained at moderately high levels on the basis of far less than full employment, full-time for absolutely everyone of working age.

Post-productivists mostly see this as a matter of social choice, collectively opting for a more relaxed life. [12] Some of them say it is also a matter of economic necessity, supposing that there is and will remain a serious oversupply of labour in advanced capitalist economies. [13] That further claim may or may not be true: unprecedentedly high employment rates such as have been experienced in the United States in recent years might seem to belie that claim. But even if advanced capitalist economies can (at least in some periods) use all the labour they can get, the central post-productivist claim is simply that they need not. Economic productivity can be sustained perfectly well without trying to put everyone into full-time work.

The 'post-productivist problematic', thus construed, is very different from the productivist one. On the 'work' side of the ledger, the problem is presented more as one of rationing jobs than of filling them. [14] On the 'welfare' side of the ledger, the problem is presented as one of decoupling income from paid labour, securing a decent level of income for those who (by choice or necessity) fail to secure one for themselves in the ordinary labour market. [15]

Different welfare regimes are characterized by their differing priorities and core value commitments. Liberals focus on values of efficiency, corporatists on stability and social democrats on equality. [16] The core post-productivist value commitment is to autonomy. [17]

There are of course many ways to understand that notion, and many ways in which social arrangements might enhance or undermine it. [18] One person or group's autonomy can sometimes only be promoted at the expense of another's; [19] one aspect of a person's autonomy can sometimes be promoted only at the expense of some other aspects of that same person's autonomy; and so on. What sort of metric we might use in calibrating such autonomy-autonomy trade-offs has yet to be specified in any detail. Still, rough intuitive understanding of the notion is sufficient to allow us to say with some confidence that certain arrangements are more conducive than others to a fair share of autonomy all around.

Even if we cannot specify with any precision what exactly is required for autonomy, we can specify certain things that preclude people from being self-legislating agents with 'the capacity to reflect upon their lives and shape them'. [20] Dire economic necessity is clearly one among them. It is a boringly analytical truth that 'necessity is the enemy of choice', and hence of autonomy. So too is interpersonal domination, in its various forms. No one can be self-legislating who is utterly subject to the will of another.

Post-productivists build on such partial analyses of autonomy in framing their central policy concerns. They strive to secure people's autonomy by ensuring that people receive an income adequate to their needs, on terms which impinge minimally on their freedom of action. That later condition implies that their income must not be made 'conditional' on anything else: people must have an adequate income in their own right, independently of household attachments, of labour force participation, or of jumping through any bureaucratic hoops. [21]

'Impinging minimally on their freedom of action' also implies that people's income should come to them in such a way that leaves them with sufficient 'discretionary time' in which actually to make use of it. Time is the ultimately scarce good; and time is a crucial component in the fully-specified production function for any other good. [22] People can be, and often are, 'time poor' as well as 'money poor'. [23] Controlling how people spend their time is an important element of social control and a significant barrier to their full autonomy. [24] Post-productivists are acutely sensitive to all these issues.

These, then, are the three principal policy priorities which follow from post-productivists' concern with autonomy. First, they want income adequacy. Secondly, they want temporal adequacy. And thirdly, they want both to be provided in a way which involves minimal conditionality.

Such post-productivist priorities have never been fully and formally embraced by social policy makers anywhere in the world. Still, intimations can be found. I shall suggest that - on the work-welfare side of the social equation - the Netherlands in the late 1980s and early 1990s provided a fair indication of what post-productivism might look like in practice. [25] Those who suppose that the post-productivist ideal is impossibly Utopian should look to the Netherlands in that period and think again. [26]

The strategy of this article is as follows. First, I shall sketch one very simple way of operationalizing a work-welfare typology of welfare regimes and show that that typology effectively replicates all the conventional welfare-regime clusters. Refining the 'work' variable in the next section makes the Netherlands stand out even more clearly in post-productivist ways. Looking at the performance of that unique exemplar of the post-productivist regime, it seems to have proven unusually successful at promoting 'autonomy' along all the dimensions of concern to post-productivists, ensuring both income adequacy and temporal adequacy in ways which are minimally conditional and hence autonomy-respecting. The article proceeds to a brief discussion of how that came about in the Netherlands and what has happened there since (which might best be seen as a shift from a 'basic-income post-productivist regime' to a 'participation-income post-productivist regime'). It ends by recalling, however, that interesting though the case of the Netherlands may be, it is the larger work-and-welfare and associated time-and-money way of looking at welfare states - post-productivist potentially among them - that is of central concern.

OPERATIONALIZING A SIMPLE WORK-WELFARE TYPOLOGY

In comparative welfare state research, regime types are ordinarily identified through the use of multiple indicators, blended together in many complex ways. Esping-Anderson, for example, grounded his famous 'three worlds' categorization on seven basic indicators, which were themselves composites of up to three others. [27]

Against that background of complexity, it is gratifying how neatly those same countries sort themselves into fundamentally the same groupings on the basis of just two very simple 'work--welfare' dimensions. As a first cut, let me take the very simplest indicator along each of those dimensions. The 'welfare' measure which I shall use is the oldest one we have of social welfare regime types: the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) that each country spends on social security. [28] The measure of 'work' I shall be using here is just the standard Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) indicator of each country's 'labour force participation rate'. [29]

Here I shall be examining the statistics, circa 1993, for the eighteen 'old OECD' countries canvassed in Esping-Andersen's original 1990 study of the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. I shall take 70 per cent as the cutoff between 'high' and 'low' labour-force participation rates, and I shall take 20 per cent as the cutoff between 'high' and 'low' social security expenditures. [30] Categorizing countries according to those criteria sorts the eighteen countries of the 'old OECD' into the four cells of Figure 1.

Reconfirming the Standard Three Worlds

The first thing to notice about Figure 1 is how effectively that new cross-categorization succeeds in sorting the great majority of these countries into their standardly-accepted regime clusters. [31]

The top-right cell contains all the classically liberal countries of the OECD: Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and the US. [32] It makes perfect sense that those liberal regimes should be found in this cell. Emphasizing as they do 'work, not welfare', liberal welfare regimes should be expected both to have high labour-force participation and to have low social spending.

The bottom-right cell in Figure 1 contains such classically social democratic countries as Denmark, Finland and Sweden. [33] It makes perfect sense, too, for social democratic regimes to cluster in this cell. Emphasizing as they do

'work and welfare', social democratic welfare regimes should be expected to combine both high social spending and high labour force participation.

The top-left cell in Figure 1 contains the classically conservative-corporatist welfare regimes of Germany and Italy. [34] Corporatist regimes emphasize 'welfare through work', with two crucial consequences for the present classificatory exercise. First, occupational pensions and benefits do much of the work that elsewhere is done by public programmes, and we ought naturally to expect lower social security spending in corporatist regimes in consequence. Secondly, the traditional conservative-corporatist model is based on a notion of the 'family wage'. In that breadwinner's welfare state, everyone is supposed to be integrated into a household, and every household is supposed to be integrated into the market in turn through the labour-force participation of the (traditionally, male) head of the households. Labour force participation among married women, particularly those with school-aged children, is neither expected nor particularly encouraged. Thus, while we ought to expect corporatists to promote high labour force participation rates among heads of household, we ought also to expect lower labour force participation rates overall in corporatist regimes because of the way in which corporatists fail to encourage (or positively discourage) homemakers from entering the paid labour force.

In short, this 'work--welfare' way of categorizing countries effectively replicates Esping-Andersen's classic typology. It identifies essentially the same clusters, locating broadly the same countries in broadly the same three groups.

Identifying a New Regime Type

Having reassured ourselves on that score, our attention naturally shifts to the novel fourth cell at the bottom-left of Figure 1. Contained there are four countries -- Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands -- characterized by low labour-force participation rates but high social spending.

All four of those countries have corporatist histories. Each has, in its own way and for its own reasons, come to engage in higher social spending than is standard among other corporatist regimes; and that is an interesting and important fact about each of those countries. But in three out of those four cases, that higher social spending came about without fundamentally altering the conservative-Catholic cast of the socio-political regime that gave rise to corporatism in the first place. In the Netherlands, in contrast, social spending

increased as part of a sea-change in fundamental social and political life that came with 'depillarization' and the end of the stranglehold that the so-called 'confessional' parties had long exercised on governing coalitions. [35]

For one telling statistic, divorce rates give a clear indication of the extent to which each of these four countries is still dominated by the conservative-Catholic ethos. In Austria, Belgium and France, divorce rates remain well below the OECD average. The divorce rate in the Netherlands, in contrast, now exceeds the OECD average by about as much as the others in this cell fall short of it. [36]

I propose, then, to split the cluster of countries in the bottom-left cell of Figure 1 into two groups. One group consists of Austria, Belgium and France: those are essentially just 'high-spending corporatist regimes'. The other group consists of the singular case of the Netherlands, which shed its corporatist past and (I shall argue) represents a distinctly new sort of 'post-productivist welfare regime'.

Whether or not the Netherlands really does represent a distinct class of welfare regime, or whether it is just an extreme example of the high-spending variant of the corporatist regime, is an issue to be addressed in various ways over the course of this article. As a 'first statistical stab' at trying to decide whether the Netherlands' welfare regime is distinctive, let us look in a little more detail at those same elementary indicators of work (labour-force participation rates) and welfare (social security expenditures as a percentage of GDP). Figure 2 plots each country's performance on those two indicators, for all eighteen OECD countries under study.

The same clusters identified in Figure 1 are immediately evident in Figure 2. The eight regimes classified as 'liberal' in Figure 1 form a distinct cluster at the top left of Figure 2. The three regimes classified as 'social democratic' form another clear cluster at the top right of Figure 2. The three paradigmatically 'corporatist' regimes from Figure 1 (Germany, Ireland and Italy) form a less tight cluster across the bottom left of Figure 2. Presumably, though, no one doubts that those are corporatist regimes. The question is merely which, if any, of the four other historically corporatist regimes at the bottom left of Figure 1 should be classed as corporatist along with them.

One way to decide that question is by seeing just how far apart each of those other countries are from the low-spending corporatist core in Figure 2. The three classically low-work, low-spending corporatist regimes (Germany,

Ireland, Italy) are contained in the smaller of the three overlapping ovals at the bottom of Figure 2. Expanding our catchment to the middle-sized oval in Figure 2 would allow us to capture the three other regimes named in Figure 1 as 'high-spending corporatist regimes' (Austria, Belgium, France). If we wanted to include the Dutch welfare regime within the same category, we would have to extend the oval by that much again (to the largest oval at the bottom of Figure 2). That would be a pretty big stretch for a pretty small gain, expanding the area of the oval as much again merely in order to include a single extra case within the category.

That constitutes a graphic illustration of the similarity between high-spending and low-spending corporatist regimes, and of the distinctiveness of the Dutch regime from the rest of that corporatist cluster, merely in terms of the simplest operationalization of the work--welfare dichotomy. Once we start refining our 'work' variable by unpacking labour-force participation rates, the distinctiveness of the Dutch regime emerges even more starkly still.

Of course, 'labour force participation rates' of the sort just reported average across the entire working-age population and across all types of work. As such, they elide many differences which might matter in various ways. For present purposes, differences in two dimensions are of particular concern.

First, males and females display very different work patterns. Historically, male labour-force participation rates have everywhere been far higher than female ones. And while female labour-force participation rates are everywhere increasing, corporatist welfare regimes in particular still vaguely discourage labour-force participation (certainly on a full-time basis, anyway) among women with school-aged children. Clearly, in unpacking labour-force participation rates we ought to look separately at males and females.

Secondly, overall labour-force participation rates make no distinctions between full-time and part-time work. In these statistics, part-time workers are counted as 'participating', fully on a par with full-time workers. In unpacking labour-force participation rates, therefore, we also have to look separately at full-time and part-time work.

From a productivist point of view, of course, full-time work is good and part-time work is a second-best. Different productivist regimes modulate that general principle in their own ways. (Corporatists, for example, emphasize full-time work primarily for males or heads of households.) But that is the basic principle that broadly speaking guides all productivist regimes.

From a post-productivist point of view, in contrast, part-time work is better than full-time work, other things being equal. Post-productivists would go on to stipulate that the decision to work part-time must be voluntary and people's incomes (whether from the market or the state) must be adequate to meet their basic needs, as well. But as long as those further conditions are satisfied, post-productivists would welcome the sort of temporal autonomy - the capacity for people to arrange their affairs as they please -- that comes with part-time rather than full-time work.

Let us examine first male employment patterns from this perspective. Figure 3 displays the employment rate for working-age males along the horizontal axis and the proportion of that employment which is part-time along the vertical. [37]

Figure 3 shows few clear differences between liberal and social democratic regimes when it comes to male employment practices. The other two regimes do, however, stand out clearly -- the corporatist regimes at the bottom and the post-productivist Dutch regime at the top. Corporatists may be sorry not to have a higher proportion of their working-age males in employment; but at least they will be gratified that a much larger proportion of male employment is full-time rather than part-time, compared to all the other regimes. Conversely, post-productivists, valuing as they do 'free time', might be sorry that the Dutch employment rates are not lower altogether; but at least they will be gratified that part-time employment is higher for males in the Netherlands than in any of the other OECD countries shown in Figure 3.

Next, let us look at the same statistics for females. Figure 4 shows predictably high rates of female employment among social democratic countries and predictably low rates among corporatist ones. A somewhat higher proportion of female employment is part-time in social democratic countries than in corporatist ones, and a substantially higher proportion yet again is part-time in liberal countries. But again it is the Dutch regime that stands out, having both comparatively low proportions of female employment and unprecedentedly large proportions in part-time employment. [38] This is just as the post-productivist model would prescribe.

AUTONOMY, TIME AND MONEY

Having thus isolated four distinct sorts of welfare regimes (or five, depending on how you count the two subgroups within the corporatist class), let us now

examine the performance of each. The principal post-productivist policy concerns, as set out above, are money, time and the impact those have on your capacity to organize your life as you please.

One precondition of social autonomy is 'income adequacy'. People whose incomes are inadequate to meet their basic needs simply have to do something to remedy that, in short order; and usually they do not enjoy the luxury of very many choices as to what that must be. Inadequate income almost always impinges upon people's autonomy, sooner rather than later.

A second precondition of social autonomy is 'temporal adequacy'. You cannot be autonomous, in the sense that matters to post-productivists anyway, if you have to spend every waking hour working to earn just enough money to meet bare subsistence needs. Discretionary time, more generally, is another important resource in autonomously organizing your life as you please.

Income adequacy -- or, rather, the lack of it -- can be measured through poverty rates. Poverty is defined, within the OECD and among comparative poverty researchers worldwide, as having less than half the median equivalent disposable income among people in your country. [39] Poverty rates are reported on that basis by the OECD. [40]

A measure of 'temporal adequacy' -- or rather the lack of it, once again -- might be the proportion of their time people spend in paid labour. True, some people enjoy their work and freely choose to devote many hours to it; and true, paid labour is not the only sort of labour people have to do (more of which below). Still, as a first cut at a measure of temporal autonomy, we can just average the number of hours per year spent in paid labour across all people (male and female, employed or not) who are of working age (16 through 64) across the country as a whole. [41]

Plotting those statistics for the half of the eighteen OECD countries for which they are available yields Figure 5. There we see that the regime clusters which Figure 1 identified on the basis of their more general work-welfare characteristics also re-emerge with distinct profiles on these indicators of economic and temporal adequacy as well. Liberal regimes sit above and to the right of the rest, with both less income adequacy (higher poverty rates) and less temporal adequacy (higher work hours). Corporatist regimes sit below liberal ones in Figure 5, having similar poverty rates but generally lower working hours (averaging across both women and men, remember). [42] Social democratic regimes sit to the left of both liberal and corporatist ones in

Figure 5: they have lower poverty rates; and average hours in paid labour are higher in social democratic regimes than in corporatist ones but generally marginally lower than in liberal ones.

From the point of view of the present exercise, however, the principal contribution of Figure 5 is to emphasize just how distinctive the post-productivist model truly is. Figure 5 dramatically depicts the Netherlands standing clearly apart from all other clusters. Its combination of high temporal autonomy (very low work hours) and high economic autonomy (very low poverty rates) has no equivalent elsewhere. [43]

Hours in paid labour are only part of the story, though. There is work to be done at home as well as in the factory; and the total number of hours a person spends in labour includes both paid and unpaid components. Since unpaid labour occurs outside the market, data on it do not systematically figure in the ordinary OECD compilations in the same way as do hours in paid labour. Instead, time in unpaid labour must be surmised from 'time use surveys,' conducted from time to time in various countries. [44] These surveys are problematic in various ways: they have not all been conducted using exactly the same methodology; they have not all been conducted in the same year; [45] and so on. Still, they are the best we can do if we are to capture unpaid household labour time.

Using the most recent compilation available in the University of Essex ESRC Micro-Social Change Centre's Multinational Comparative Time Budget Data Archive, we can calculate the average weekly hours spent in paid labour and unpaid household labour, taken together, for people of working age (16 through 64). [46] These total hours of paid labour and unpaid household labour are then plotted against poverty rates, as before, to form Figure 6.

Taking paid labour hours and unpaid household labour hours together changes the picture dramatically, in one respect. In Figure 5 corporatists averaged relatively low hours of paid labour (certainly so, averaging across the entire working-age population; it would have been so, however, even just averaging across those actually in the labour force). In Figure 6 we see that, taking account of paid labour and unpaid household labour together, corporatists can no longer be seen as leading a relatively leisured life. People in those countries spend fully as much time in paid labour or unpaid household labour as do people in social democratic countries, and even in most liberal ones.

For present purposes, though, our principal interest lies in the placement of the post-productivist Dutch regime. That stands out even more starkly in Figure 6 as representing a truly distinct pattern. On the evidence of time-use surveys, it would seem that people in the Netherlands spend very substantially less time in paid labour and unpaid household labour combined than do people in any of the other nine OECD countries for which such data is available. And, as remarked before, they experience very low rates of poverty as well. Both their temporal autonomy and their economic autonomy are thus well-served.

AUTONOMY AND MINIMAL CONDITIONALITY

Income adequacy and temporal adequacy are two necessary conditions for leading one's life as one pleases. But necessary though they are, they are not in themselves sufficient. The process by which they are obtained must be autonomy-respecting as well. Someone whose income and discretionary time are in themselves adequate might still not enjoy autonomy, if the process of obtaining them is so hedged by conditions as to deprive that person of any substantial autonomy.

These are issues which are not traditionally of much interest to economists, or hence to collectors of official statistics. Still, there are a few respects in which official statistics can be brought to bear on those issues. It is, however, very much a matter of 'making do with what is to hand'. We ought not to imagine for a moment that these are the best possible, much less only possible, indicators of the ways in which 'conditionality' might impinge on autonomy.

The Voluntariness of Non-employment

For some people, not being employed in paid labour is a matter of free choice. Some people genuinely prefer to stay at home, to care for young children for example, rather than enter the paid labour market; and sometimes they have partners who are willing and able to cross-subsidize that choice. [47] Other people, however, want paid work and simply cannot find it. For them, post-employment is not at all a voluntary choice.

'Unemployment', on the official definition, refers to the number of people who are seeking paid work but cannot find any. 'Discouraged worker' is a more amorphous category of people who want paid work but who have given up searching for it, on the assumption (often reasonable, given their past experience) that they would be unable to find any work even if they looked.

Both those groups -- both unemployed and discouraged workers -- can clearly be said to be 'involuntarily' out of work. Those might not be the only categories of people who are involuntarily out of work, but those are the groups for which the OECD reports data. [48]

Figure 7 categorizes countries according to two measures. First, on the horizontal axis, countries are categorized according to the proportion of the working-age population (16-64) in the country that is not in paid employment. [49] Then countries are categorized, on the vertical axis, according to the proportion of that post-employment which is 'voluntary', in the minimal sense of not representing involuntary unemployment or discouraged workers. That conjunction of measures is available for the fifteen OECD countries plotted in Figure 7.

We see from Figure 7 that non-employment is comparatively high among corporatist countries (as their ethos of non-working homemakers would lead us to expect) [50] and comparatively low among liberal countries (as their ethos of 'work, not welfare' would lead us to expect). Among social democratic countries, too, non-employment is generally low. [51] Furthermore, just as we would expect, in corporatist countries non-employment is largely voluntary but less often so in liberal and especially social democratic regimes.

In the present context, our principal interest lies in where the post-productivist Dutch regime sits in this constellation. Post-productivists would aspire to higher rates of non-employment (valuing as they do the free time that that provides); and (valuing autonomy as they do) they would be anxious that that non-employment be voluntary rather than involuntary. That is to say, the post-productivist ideal would be towards the top right of Figure 7.

That is indeed where the Netherlands falls. True, almost half the countries have non-employment rates higher than that of the Netherlands. But in most of those cases, much less of that non-employment is voluntary than it is in the Netherlands. The Netherlands' combination of high, and highly voluntary, non-employment is not unique among the countries shown in Figure 7. (Two corporatist countries -- Belgium and Italy -- beat the Netherlands on both scores.)

But the Netherlands is very much among the OECD league-leaders along those twin dimensions of post-productivism.

The Voluntariness of Part-time Employment

Post-productivists, valuing as they do autonomy, would also be keen that people should be permitted to arrange their paid work hours to suit themselves, through working part-time among other things. Thus, other things being equal, high rates of part-time working would be good news from a post-productivist point of view.

Not everyone who is working part-time is doing so of their own volition, however. Some people want full-time paid work but have to settle for less. They are working part-time involuntarily' -- and that is something that post-productivists, valuing autonomy as they do, would oppose. So too conveniently enough, does the OECD report data on that phenomenon under the heading of 'supplementary measures of labour market slack'. [52]

Figure 8 plots proportion of the working-age population (16-64) in part-time employment on the horizontal axis. [53] The proportion of that part-time work which is 'voluntary' (in that narrow sense of not wanting to work more hours) is plotted on the vertical axis. The post-productivist ideal, once again, is towards the top right.

As we see from Figure 8, there is no clear differentiation between the other three welfare regimes - liberal, corporatist and social democratic - along these dimensions. But the post-productivist Netherlands clearly stands out for its unique combination of high and highly voluntary part-time working. There are other countries in which a larger proportion of part-time workers are voluntary, but in all those countries there are fewer part-time workers altogether. There is literally no country, among the fifteen OECD countries plotted in Figure 8, which has more part-time workers and a larger proportion of them working part-time voluntarily. In this respect, the Netherlands clearly embodies the post-productivist ideal - and uniquely so.

Public Policies of Forced Labour

Valuing autonomy as they do, post-productivists emphasize optionality. People can be said to be freely entering the labour market only if they were also free not to do so.

Public policy can effectively deny people the option of remaining outside the labour force in various ways. One is through niggardly income-support policies, which mean that the only way people can acquire an adequate

income is by engaging in paid labour. Another is employment policies tying government support for people out of work to their participation in schemes designed to make them work-ready and, indeed, ultimately to make them work.

As a measure of the extent to which inadequate income support policies force people to engage in paid labour, we can look at the relative disposable income of people in households containing no wage earners. [54] The lower the income of non-earner households, the greater the pressure for people in such households to enter the paid labour market. As a measure of the way in which governments' employment policies force people into paid labour, we might take the proportion of the population engaged in 'active labour market policies' to make them 'job-ready' in one way or another. [55]

From Figure 9, we see that liberal countries rely principally upon economic pressure to force people into paid labour, whereas social democrats rely principally upon active labour market policies to do so. Corporatists are a more varied lot. Some of them (the low-spending ones) rely upon a marginally more generous version of the liberal strategy; others (the high-spending ones) rely upon a rather less draconian version of the social democratic strategy.

Yet the principal interest, in the present context, lies in the placement of the post-productivist Dutch regime in this constellation. As we see from Figure 9, the Netherlands occupies a unique niche at the bottom right (i.e., most post-productivist) corner. Other countries might equal it in terms of their low political pressure to work (low active labour market programme participation rates); and other countries might better it in terms of the disposable income that they provide to no-earner households. But no country matches or betters the Netherlands in terms of both criteria taken together. No country provides, at one and the same time, both more money to non-earning households and less pressure to participate in active labour market programmes.

THE DUTCH EXPERIMENT: HOW DID IT HAPPEN? CAN IT LAST?

Talk as we may for comparative analytical purposes about ideal 'regime types', no actual welfare state is characterized by a single unified animating idea. The Netherlands -- like all countries -- came to its welfare regime largely by accident, through a combination of historical accretions, socio-economic exigencies, political cross-currents and so on. [56]

Certainly, no politician in power ever intended to make the Netherlands post-productivist. Some, in more recent years, have come to advocate some such model rather more explicitly. [57] But at the outset, generous provision for people outside the workforce was motivated in the Netherlands more by a neocorporatist concern to signal social recognition of the value of unpaid labour, particularly in child-rearing and community work. [58]

For the most part, Dutch politicians seeing the Netherlands heading in a post-productivist direction have tried to reverse that trend. [59] They complained bitterly about the way in which sickness and disability benefits were being used to buy out surplus labour by facilitating the early exit of workers from the workforce; and they instituted a swag of welfare reforms from 1987 onwards to try to reduce welfare dependency and to increase employment rates. [60]

Dutch labour-force participation has indeed increased dramatically over the past decade. But significantly from the perspective of the post-productivist model, most of that growth has come in the form of part-time female labour-force participation. [61] 'Among couples the modern work pattern' in the Netherlands is one of "one-and-a-half jobs", the man working (nearly) full time, the woman part time'. [62] By 1996, fully one in five employees in the Netherlands had a job politely characterized as 'flexible' (very part-time, temporary, on-call, or such like). [63]

The prime minister's battle cry may be, 'Work, work, work', and an explicit 'activation obligation' was written into the 1996 revision of the Social Assistance Act. [64] But both the Christian Democratic party and the Labour party continue to emphasize the value of unpaid 'voluntary work, the upbringing of children and neighbourhood care' as all being valuable forms of labour; and public opinion clearly supports them in that. [65] Those are all classically corporatist concerns, in a way. But they are also ones which, in the right circumstances, can feed powerfully into a broadly post-productivist vision.

Perhaps the best way to characterize the changing Dutch work--welfare arrangements over the past couple of decades is to distinguish two distinct styles of post-productivist regime, one organized around unconditional 'basic income' and the other organized around 'participation income' conditional on socially-useful labour. Fifteen years ago, Dutch work--welfare arrangements effectively (albeit unintentionally) approximated the former; today they more

nearly (and perhaps only slightly more intentionally) approximate the latter. Everyone is being pressed to do some work, but not necessarily very much.

As I said at the outset, 'welfare without work' understood literally is an impossible ideal. If no one were producing, there would be nothing to distribute, much less redistribute. But it is perfectly possible, within those constraints, to valorize a broader range of things as socially useful 'work' and to allow individuals more autonomy in arranging their working time (paid and unpaid) as they will.

Economists tell us there are twin tradeoffs to be faced in these realms. One is between work and leisure; another is between equity and efficiency.

According to the data I have presented here, the Dutch in the 1980s and early 1990s would seem to have opted in a relatively dramatic way for the 'less productive' fork in both dimensions, sustaining simultaneously low working hours and high public welfare benefits. Economists insist that they have to pay an economic price for those choices, and it was precisely such fears that led Dutch political leaders to back away from the bolder form of post-productivism in recent years.

But consider the economic facts. Despite leisurely working hours and generous social welfare policies at its post-productivist peak, the Netherlands none the less managed to turn in a very strong economic performance. Over the period 1989-94, the average year-to-year increase in Dutch GDP was 2.3 per cent. [66] That makes Dutch GDP growth the fourth highest among the eighteen countries of the old OECD, substantially higher than the average growth of 1.6 per cent over that period experienced by those eighteen countries taken as a whole. Of course, no one knows how much the Dutch economy would have grown had its work and welfare policies been different. Still, at the very least we can say that even a bold post-productivist option proved economically eminently affordable, for the one country that has come closest to implementing it. [67]

CONCLUSION

Interesting though the Dutch case is, it is actually only incidental to the main thrust of this article. My larger purpose has been to focus attention on a new constellation of work-and-welfare variables. Those allow us, at one and the same time, to reconstruct all the classic welfare regimes on more coherent and

cohesive foundations and to see further possibilities for alternative welfare futures, in which time matters as much as money.

(*) Social & Political Theory and Philosophy Programs, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. Earlier versions were presented to the Working Group on Social Policy and Political Theory, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris, and the Havens Center for the Study of Social Structure and Social Change, University of Wisconsin, Madison. For discussion of these issues, I am grateful to Michael Bittman, Harry Brighouse, Frank Castles, Gosta Esping-Andersen, Nancy Folbre, Heiner Gan[β]mann, Diane Gibson, Bruce Headey, Alan Hunt, Andy Levine, Bernard Manin, Bernd Main, Ulrich Muckenberger, Ruud Muffels, Henk-Jan Dirven, Claus Offe, Martin Rein, Stein Ringen, Art Stinchcombe, Goran Therborn, Frank Vandenbroucke, Philippe Van Parijs, Hugh Ward and Eric Olin Wright. I am also indebted to Albert Weale and this Journal's anonymous referees. None of them, of course, bears any responsibility for the final product.

(1.) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *Making Work Pay: Taxation, Benefits, Employment and Unemployment* (Paris: OECD, 1997). G. Esping-Andersen, 'Welfare States Without Work: The Impasse of Labour Shedding and Familialism in Continental European Social Policy', in G. Esping-Andersen, ed., *Welfare States in Transition* (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 66-87, and *Social Foundations of Post-industrial Economics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Parallel concerns with how to articulate the demands of paid and unpaid work are reflected in, e.g.: P. England and B. S. Kilbourne, 'Markets, Marriages and Other Mates', in R. Friedland and A. F. Robertson, eds, *Beyond the Marketplace* (New York: de Gruyter, 1990); J. B. Schor, *The Overworked American* (New York: Basic Books, 1991); and A. R. Hochschild, *The Second Shift* (New York: Viking, 1989), and *The Time Bind* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997).

(2.) K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York: Rinehart, 1944), Pt. 2; R. M. Titmuss, *Social Policy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974), p. 30. Tellingly, liberal welfare reformers take as their slogan 'making work pay'; see the 1997 OECD publication of that title and the account of recent US reforms in M. J. Bane and D. T. Eliwood, *Welfare Realities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).

(3.) Titmuss, *Social Policy*, p. 31. Feminists dub this a 'male breadwinner's welfare state'; H. Land, 'The Family Wage', *Feminist Review*, 6 (1980), 55-77; J. Lewis, 'Gender and Welfare Regimes', *Journal of European Social Policy*, 2 (1992), 159-71; N. Fraser, 'After the Family Wage: Gender Equity and the Welfare State', *Political Theory*, 22 (1994), 591-618; and D. Sainsbury, *Gender, Equality and Welfare States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

(4.) Sweden, Esping-Andersen says, practises 'productivist social justice', wherein the 'welfare state invests in optimizing people's capacity to be productive citizens' (G. Esping-Andersen, 'Welfare States and the Economy', in N. J. Smelser and R. Swedberg, eds, *The Handbook of Economic Sociology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 711-32 at p. 722); see further Esping-Andersen, *Social Foundations of Post-industrial Economics*, chap. 4. A more formal analysis is set out in K. O. Moene and M. Wallerstein, 'How Social Democracy Worked: Labor-market Institutions', *Politics & Society*, 23 (1995),

185-212. It should come as no surprise that 'labourist' ideology animates social democratic welfare regimes, given their political roots in labour movements (W. Korpi, *The Democratic Class Struggle* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983); G. Esping-Andersen, *Politics Against Markets* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); and F. G. Castles, *The Social Democratic Image of Society* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978)).

(5.) A term Esping-Andersen ('Welfare States and the Economy', p. 713) uses in a rather more specific way to characterize the Swedish model, in particular. Note that they all adopt a fairly narrow understanding of what might count as a 'productive' contribution, defining it in terms of paid but not unpaid labour (which is possibly equally productive, in some broader sense).

(6.) J. H. Dreze and E. Malinvaud, 'Growth and Employment: The Scope for a European Initiative', *European Economy (Reports & Studies)*, No. 1(1994), 77-106; T. Iversen and A. Wren, 'Equality, Employment and Budgetary Restraint: The Trilemma of the Service Economy', *World Politics*, 50 (1998), 507-46.

(7.) A. Okun, *Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1975); Iversen and Wren, 'Equality, Employment and Budgetary Restraint'. Of course, there may not be any need for tradeoffs, insofar as for example state welfare services serve as investments in human capital; see Esping-Andersen, 'Welfare States and the Economy' and A. B. Atkinson, *The Economic Consequences of Rolling Back the Welfare State* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999).

(8.) The term adapted from C. Offe, 'A Non-productivist Design for Social Policies', in P. Van Parijs, ed., *Arguing for Basic Income* (London: Verso, 1992), pp. 61-80. My 'post-productivist' phrasing seems to get their emphasis more nearly right: post-productivists are not opposed, or even indifferent, to economic output (as the 'non-productivist' formulation might seem to imply); they have simply 'gotten over' being utterly fixated on it, as productivists have been (something the 'post-productivist' phrasing seems better at capturing).

(9.) To embrace what Esping-Andersen intended as an unflattering description of Continental European practices, when writing about 'Welfare states without work'.

(10.) 'Decommodified', in Esping-Andersen's famous phrase; G. Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Oxford: Polity, 1990).

(11.) Cf. J. Elster, 'Is There (or Should There Be) a Right to Work?' in A. Gutmann, ed., *Democracy and the Welfare State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 52-78.

(12.) S. B. Linder, *The Harried Leisure Class* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); G. Rehn, 'Towards a Society of Free Choice', in J. J. Wiatr and R. Rose, eds, *Comparing Public Policies* (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy imienia Ossolinskich Wydawnictow Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1977), pp. 121-57; M. White, *Working Hours: Assessing the Potential for Reduction* (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1987); A. Gorz, *Critique of*

Economic Reason, trans. G. Handyside and C. Turner (London: Verso, 1989); P. Van Parijs, *Real Freedom for All* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

(13.) F. Block, *Postindustrial Possibilities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); K. Hinrichs, W. Roche and C. Sirianni, eds, *Working Time in Transition* (Philadelphia, Pa: Temple University Press, 1991); B. Jessop, 'The Transition to Post-Fordism and the Schumpeterian Workfare State', in R. Burrows and B. Loader, eds, *Towards a Post-Fordist Welfare State?* (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 13-37; J. Rifkin, *The End of Work* (New York: Tarcher/Putnam, 1995); C. Offe and R. G. Heinze, *Beyond Employment*, trans. A. Braley (Oxford: Polity, 1992); C. Offe, 'Towards a New Equilibrium of Citizens' Rights and Economic Resources', in OECD, *Social Cohesion and the Globalizing Economy* (Paris: OECD, 1997), pp. 81-108.

(14.) Hence post-productivist proposals of 'shorter hours' strategies aimed at spreading employment around; S. A. Levitan and R. S. Belous, *Shorter Hours, Shorter Weeks* (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); cf. G. Therborn, *Why Some Peoples Are More Unemployed Than Others* (London: Verso, 1986). See also proposals for 'sabbatical accounts' (Offe, 'Towards a New Equilibrium of Citizens' Rights and Economic Resources') and 'labour coupons' (B. Haminga, 'Demoralizing the Labor Market', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 3 (1995), 23-35).

(15.) Hence post-productivist proposals for 'basic income'. See J. E. Meade, 'Full Employment, New Technology and the Distribution of Income', *Journal of Social Policy*, 13 (1984), 129-46; and Van Parijs, *Arguing for Basic Income and Real Freedom for All*. A variation on 'basic income' is 'participation income', paid conditionally on participation in some socially-useful activity; see A. B. Atkinson, 'The Case for a Participation Income', *Political Quarterly*, 67 (1996), 67-70.

(16.) R. E. Goodin, B. Headey, R. Muffels and H-J. Dirven, *Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 2.

(17.) One of the things we might, and on any sensible description of the good life should, autonomously choose to do is to render ourselves vulnerable to certain others in certain ways. To argue for autonomy is not to enshrine autarky but rather mutually-chosen interdependencies (R. E. Goodin, *Protecting the Vulnerable* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), chap. 7).

(18.) R. Lindley, *Autonomy* (London: Macmillan, 1986); G. Dworkin, *The Theory and Practice of Autonomy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and T. E. Hill Jr, *Autonomy and Self-respect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The scope for debate over what constitutes 'real freedom' in respect of 'basic income', for example, can be surmised from Van Parijs, *Real Freedom for All*; B. Barry, 'Real Freedom and Basic Income', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 4 (1996), 242-76; R. van der Veen, 'Real Freedom and Basic Income: Comment on Brian Barry', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 5 (1997), 274-86, and 'Real Freedom Versus Reciprocity: Competing Views on the Justice of Unconditional Basic Income', *Political Studies*, 46 (1997), 140--63.

(19.) If what people lose when they have money taxed away is properly described as 'freedom', then what people gain when that tax money is redistributed to them must be properly describable in those same terms, as well; P. Jones, 'Freedom and the Redistribution of Resources', *Journal of Social Policy*, 11(1982), 217-38.

(20.) Dworkin, *Theory and Practice of Autonomy*, p. 31. This strategy of focusing on negative rather than positive conditions of the good in view parallels that of B. Moore Jr. *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1970).

(21.) Thus, post-productivists would share the social democratic impetus towards 'decommodification', making people's income streams independent of labour market participation; Esping-Andersen, *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, pp. 21-2. They would also insist that those social benefits should come in the form of welfare rights, rather than discretionary payments; C. A. Reich, 'The New Property' *Yale Law Journal*, 73 (1964), 733-87, and R. E. Goodin, *Reasons for Welfare* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), chap. 7. They would also be anxious that women should have an independent claim in their own right; see Lewis, 'Gender and Welfare Regimes', and Sainsbury, *Gender, Equality and Welfare States*. This is the sense in which US feminists defend Aid to Families with Dependent Children as a contribution to the autonomy of women; see A. S. Orloff, 'Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States', *American Sociological Review* 58(1993), 303 -28; Fraser, 'After the Family Wage'; and I. M. Young, 'Mothers, Citizenship and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family Values', *Ethics*, 105 (1995), 535-56.

(22.) G. S. Becker, 'A Theory of the Allocation of Time', *Economic Journal*, 75 (1965), 493-517; R. J. Zeckhauser, 'Time as the Ultimate Source of Utility', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 87 (1973), 668-75; J. N. Morgan, 'The Role of Time in the Measurement of Transfers and Well-being', in M. Moon, ed., *Economic Transfers in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 199-238.

(23.) C. Vickery, 'The Time-poor: A New Look at Poverty', *Journal of Human Resources*, 12 (1977), 27-48. The 'time bind' which preoccupies Americans (Schor, *The Overworked American*; Hochschild, *The Time Bind*) is also felt in Britain, where fully a third of male manual workers report that they would prefer to work fewer hours in paid labour than they actually do (M. B. Stewart and J. K. Swaffield, 'Constraints on the Desired Hours of Work of British Men', *Economic Journal*, 107 (1997), 520-35).

(24.) On work time and work discipline, see: E. P. Thompson, 'Time, Work Discipline and Industrial Capitalism', *Past & Present*, 38 (1967), 36-97; Moishe Postone, 'Necessity, Labour and Time: A Reinterpretation of the Marxian Critique of Capitalism', *Social Research*, 45 (1978), 739-88; and C. Sirianni, 'The Self-management of Time in Post-industrial Society', in Hinrichs, Roche and Sirianni, eds, *Working Time in Transition*.

(25.) Among Dutch scholars and policy makers, there was much discussion of the causes and consequences of the tendency towards 'early retirement' (which used to be effected largely through 'disability' benefits) and towards reduced working hours (which was in part the consequence of a formal agreement between business, labour and government,

the 1982 Wassenaar Accord). See, e.g.: Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, *Social Security in the Netherlands* (Deventer: Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers, 1990); and *The Dutch Welfare State from an international and Economic Perspective* (The Hague: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 1996); R. H. Cox, *The Development of the Dutch Welfare State* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993); C. de Neubourg, 'Where Have All the Hours Gone? Working-time Reduction Policies in the Netherlands', in Hinrichs, Roche and Sirianni, eds, *Working Time in Transition*, pp. 129-47; B. de Vroom and M. Blomsma, 'The Netherlands: An Extreme Case', in M. Kohli, M. Rein, A. M. Guillemard and H. van Gunsteren, eds, *Time for Retirement: Comparative Studies of Early Exit from the Labor Force* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 97-126; R. C. Kloosterman, 'Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism? The Welfare State and the Post-Industrial Trajectory in the Netherlands after 1980', *West European Politics*, 17 (1994), 166-89; A. Hemerijck and K. van Kersbergen, 'A Miraculous Model? Explaining the New Politics of the Welfare State in the Netherlands', *Acta Politica*, 23 (1997), 258-80; J. Visser and A. Hemerijck, *A Dutch Miracle: Job Growth, Welfare Reform and Corporatism in the Netherlands* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1997); A. Kapteyn and K. de Vos, 'Social Security and Labor Force Participation in the Netherlands', *American Economic Review (Papers & Proceedings)*, 88 (No. 2) (May 1998), 164-7; and W. van Oorschot and R. Engerlfrict, 'Work, Work, Work: Labour Market Participation Policies in the Netherlands, 1970-2000' (paper presented to Research Committee 19, International Sociological Association, Prague, September 1999). It is fair to say, however, that most of those authors join Esping-Andersen ('Welfare States Without Work') in bemoaning those tendencies rather than embracing them as leading to a positively-valued post-productivist future. Only the old report by M. Rein and R. Freeman, *The Dutch Choice: A Plea for Social Policy Complementary To Work* ('s-Gravenhage: HRWB adviescollege voor sociaal en cultureel beleid, 1988), positively embraces the changes, although even then not in unambiguously post-productivist terms.

(26.) As I have argued elsewhere, on the tax-transfer side of public policy the Netherlands is a close approximation to a social democratic welfare regime; Goodin et al., *Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, chap. 14, and R. E. Goodin and A. Smitsman, 'Placing Welfare States: The Netherlands as a Crucial Test Case', *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 2(2000), 39-64. My argument here is that, when you look at the labour-market side of the equation, the Netherlands looks more like a post-productivist regime than an old-fashioned Continental corporatist one - contrary to the claims of Esping-Andersen, 'Welfare Without Work', p. 66, and *Social Foundations of Post-industrial Economics*, chap. 4. Given that this article is a follow-on from earlier collaborations, I ought especially to emphasize that none of my previous co-authors necessarily share any of the views expressed in the present article.

(27.) For example, Esping-Andersen's measure of 'social democracy' is a composite of: average universalism of pensions and unemployment benefits; and average benefit equality of pensions, sickness and unemployment benefits. His 'liberalism' indicator combines measures of: means-tested benefits as a proportion of total public social expenditure; private pensions as a proportion of total pensions; and private spending on health as a proportion of the total. And his indicator of 'corporatism' combines the number of occupationally distinct public pension schemes and expenditure on pensions to

government employees as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). See Esping-Andersen, *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Table 2.2, p. 70.

(28.) P. Cutright, 'Political Structure, Economic Development and National Social Security Programs', *American Journal of Sociology*, 70 (1965), 537-50; H. L. Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); R. Jackman, *Politics and Social Equality* (New York: Wiley, 1972); A. Hicks and D. H. Swank, 'Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies', *American Political Science Review*, 86 (1992), 658-74. These data are famously incomplete, failing to count many things (like tax subsidies of mortgages) that really ought to count, but for the OECD do not, as social welfare transfer payments.

(29.) Labour-force participation rates are taken from OECD, 'Statistical Annex', *Employment Outlook* (Paris: OECD, 1995), Annex Table I, pp. 203-29, at p. 214. Social security expenditure as a percentage of GDP circa 1995 is taken from OECD, *Historical Statistics, 1960-95* (Paris: OECD, 1997), Table 6.3, p. 71; for New Zealand, omitted from that series, I use 'central government expenditure on social security and welfare' as a percentage of GDP, based on OECD, *OECD Economic Surveys 1997-98: New Zealand* (Paris: OECD, 1998), Table G, p. 181, and Table C, p. 178.

(30.) Those cutoffs were chosen less to generate exactly the same number of countries in each category (the breakdown is 7/11 on both dimensions) and more to 'carve nature at its joints', maximizing consonance of the resulting Figure 1 with the standard categorizations of countries into regime clusters.

(31.) That is to say, according to the original categorization in Esping-Andersen, *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Table 3.3, p. 74. There has since been much dissent, of course, and Esping-Andersen ('Welfare States and the Economy') has himself conceded the need for some adjustments.

(32.) Also in that cell are New Zealand, the United Kingdom - which Esping-Andersen (*Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, p. 74) regards as impure cases - and (more anomalously) Norway, which he classifies as classically social democratic. Norway's social spending is very substantially below that of the other Scandinavian countries, however, which unambiguously forces it into the top-right cell in terms of this classificatory scheme.

(33.) Among Esping-Andersen's strongly social democratic countries, this leaves out only Norway (as discussed in the previous note) and the Netherlands, which Esping-Andersen has never been comfortable regarding as social democratic. See G. Esping-Andersen, *Politics Against Markets* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 145, and 'Welfare States Without Work', p. 66.

(34.) Along with Ireland, which Esping-Andersen (*Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, p. 74) treats as a mixed case. I will say more shortly about the other classically corporatist countries (Austria, Belgium and France) which are left out of this cell.

(35.) Therbom, "'Pillarization" and "popular movements"'.

(36.) The average across the eighteen countries of the 'old OECD' is 2.27. The Dutch rate is 2.35. The rates in the other countries are: Austria 2.11; Belgium 2.09; and France 1.92. See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, *Demographic Yearbook 1995* (New York: UN, 1997), Table 25.

(37.) Employment rates are different from labour-force participation rates, in that the latter also includes the unemployed (who are 'available for work', and hence in the work force). Because OECD statistics report part-time employment as a proportion of total employment, it is more convenient to use employment rates for these purposes. Figures 1 and 2 would have looked much the same had we used employment rates rather than labour-force participation rates. Data are from OECD, *Employment Outlook (1995)*, Annex Table A, p. 204, and Annex Table E, p. 210.

(38.) A fact that is, of course, widely noted elsewhere. See, e.g.: J. Bussemaker and K. van Kersbergen, 'Gender Inequality and the Conservative Welfare State: A Four-nation Comparison' (paper presented to the 1996 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco); J. Plantenga, 'For Women Only? The Rise of Part-time Work in the Netherlands', *Social Politics*, 3 (1996), 57-71; and M. Van Berkel and N. D. De Graaf, 'Married Women's Economic Dependency in the Netherlands, 1979-1991', *British Journal of Sociology*, 49 (1998), 97-117.

(39.) 'Equivalent income' adjusts, through 'equivalence scales', for family size and associated economies of scale. 'Disposable income' is income net of government taxes and transfers. See Goodin et al., *Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, chap. 6.

(40.) Poverty rates are as reported in OECD, 'Income Distribution and Poverty in Selected OECD Countries', *Economic Outlook No. 62* (Paris: OECD, 1997), pp. 49-59 at p. 54.

(41.) Data on the average annual number of hours worked per person in the labour force is given in OECD, *Employment Outlook (1995)*, Annex Table C, p. 208; to get from that the average number of hours worked per person in the working-age population, whether or not they are in the labour-force, I multiply that by the labour force participation rate, given in Annex Table I, p. 214. Whereas all other data are for 1993, the Italian data are for 1983; there has been a steady decline in the number of working hours in most other countries over the intervening period, so as an estimate of 1993 work hours that figure for Italy might be anything up to 100 hours too high. Dutch data refers to 'dependent employment': for other countries for which statistics on both are reported, work hours in 'dependent employment' are marginally lower (by between 32 and 114 hours a year) than 'total employment', which is the more common statistic and hence the one reported here for all other countries.

(42.) That same general pattern would be true, albeit less dramatically, were we to confine our attention to the average annual hours worked per person in the labour force: it is not purely the larger proportions of people not in the workforce in corporatist countries that is driving this result.

(43.) Figure 5 is not just the mirror image of Figure 2 rotated around the y axis. High social security expenditures will not necessarily reduce poverty (it all depends on who gets the

money). Neither do low labour-force participation rates necessarily translate into low average working hours (it all depends on how many hours are worked by those in work). Figure 5 shows that higher social security spending does actually pay off, in terms of reduced poverty rates, and that countries with fewer people in the labour force do not work them harder in consequence.

(44.) OECD, *Household Production in OECD Countries* (Paris: OECD, 1995); L. GoldschmidtClermont and E. Pagnossin-Aligisakis, *Measures of Unrecorded Economic Activities in Fourteen Countries*, Occasional Paper No. 20, Human Development Report Office (New York: United Nations Development Program, 1995).

(45.) The data refer to: Australia 1992; Belgium 1965; Canada 1992; Denmark 1987; Finland 1987; France 1974; Germany 1965; Italy 1980; Netherlands 1985; Norway 1981; Sweden 1991; United Kingdom 1985; United States 1985.

(46.) Reported in M. Bittman and R. E. Goodin, 'An Equivalence Scale for Time', SPRC Discussion Paper No. 85 (Kensington, NSW: Social Policy Research Centre, University of New South Wales, 1998), forthcoming in *Social Indicators Research*.

(47.) That is not to say that all stay-at-home-mothers do so out of their own free choice: sometimes it is their partners who insist. That, though, is clearly something well beyond the ken of any ordinary OECD statistics.

(48.) OECD, 'Supplementary Measures of Labour Market Slack: An Analysis of Discouraged and Involuntary Part-time Workers', *Employment Outlook* (1995), pp. 43-97.

(49.) Calculated from OECD, *Employment Outlook* (1995), Annex Table A, p. 204.

(50.) Anyway, their not being employed in paid labour is not involuntary in the way that would be captured in the OECD definitions of 'unemployment' or 'discouraged worker'.

(51.) The exception which pulls the social-democratic oval way out to the right is Finland, which was suffering unprecedentedly high unemployment rates in 1993.

(52.) OECD, *Employment Outlook* (1995), Table 2.18, pp. 76-7.

(53.) Calculated from OECD, *Employment Outlook* (1995), Annex Table E, p. 210.

(54.) As reported in OECD, 'Income Distribution and Poverty in Selected OECD Countries', p. 55.

(55.) As reported in OECD, *Employment Outlook* (1995), Annex Table T, p. 222-9.

(56.) As nicely captured in K. van Kersbergen and U. Becker's title, 'The Netherlands: A Passive Social Democratic Welfare State in a Christian Democratic Ruled Society', *Journal of Social Policy*, 17 (1988), 477-99. See similarly Therborn, "Pillarization" and "popular movements".

(57.) 'The post-productivist Left in the Netherlands' within the Labour Party (PvdA) is now explicitly calling for a 'relaxed organization of labour'; R. J. van der Veen, 'Participate or Sink: Threshold Equality Behind the Dykes', *Acta Politica*, 34 (1999), 351-81, at pp. 367-73.

(58.) See the famous exchange between Prime Minister Van Agt, Terlouw (D'66) and Den Uyl (PvdA) during the 1980 Budget debate quoted in Goodin and Smitsman, 'Placing Welfare States'; see also Therborn, *Why Some Peoples are More Unemployed than Others*.

(59.) This has of course been true in high-spenders among corporatist regimes, as well. On France, for example, see: A. Favell, *Philosophies of Integration* (London: Macmillan, 1998), chap. 3; and M. Evans, S. Paugam and J. A. Preliis, 'Chunnel Vision: Poverty, Social Exclusion and the Debate on Social Welfare in France and Britain', Discussion Paper WSP/115 (London: Welfare State Programme, STICERD, London School of Economics, 1995).

(60.) Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs & Employment, *Social Security in the Netherlands and The Dutch Welfare State from an international and Economic Perspective*; R. van der Veen and W. Trommel, 'Managed Liberalization of the Dutch Welfare State: A Review and Analysis of the Reform of the Dutch Social Security System, 1985-98', *Governance*, 12 (1999), 289-310; de Vroom and Blomsma, 'The Netherlands: An Extreme Case'; Kloosterman, 'Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism?'; Hemerijck and van Kersbergen, 'A Miraculous Model?'; Visser and Hemerijck, *A Dutch Miracle*. While reforms to disability pensions officially took effect in 1987, the numbers of disability claimants continued to rise for another seven years (Hemerijck and van Kersbergen, 'A Miraculous Model?' pp. 270-4). Legislation which took effect in 1996 'requires single mothers to seek employment actively and obliges single mothers to work if day care or care-substitution is available ... the responsibility for a child is not an argument any more to exit the labour market or to reject a job' (Bussemaker and van Kersbergen, 'Gender Inequality and the Conservative Welfare State', p. 14) -- though those reforms, too, might take some while to have any real effect.

(61.) OECD, *Employment Outlook* (Paris: OECD, 1997), Table F, p. 178.

(62.) Van Oorschot and Engerlfriet, 'Work, Work, Work', p. 5.

(63.) R. Muffels and B. Steijn, *Flexible and Permanent Jobs on the Dutch Labour Market*, Research Paper 99/02, Netherlands School for Social and Economic Policy Research (Tilburg: AWSB/TISSER, 1998), p. 5.

(64.) Van Oorschot and Engerlfriet, 'Work, Work, Work'. The 'activation obligation' is an 'availability for work' requirement applying to anyone in receipt of income support, except for single parents of children under 5 and unemployed persons over 57.5 years of age; Visser and Hemerijck, *A Dutch Miracle*, p. 148.

(65.) Van der Veen, 'Participate or Sink', pp. 366-73. Whereas some 93 per cent of respondents say that the obligation to find paid employment should be applied 'strictly' to young unemployed persons, only 34 per cent think it should be applied strictly to the 'unemployed who are active in voluntary associations or community', only 16 per cent think it should be applied strictly to 'single parents with children aged 6-12, and less than

half that many think it should be applied strictly to children younger than that (van Oorschot and Engerlfriet, 'Work, Work, Work', p. 19). Notice that legislation has done much to facilitate this growth of part-time labour: part-time workers have rights to state pensions, social insurance and health care; and the Labour Time Act of 1996 directs employers to take into consideration employees' care-giving responsibilities.

(66.) OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960-1994 (Paris: OECD, 1996), Table 3.1, P. 50.

(67.) Perhaps the explanation is that the 'flexibilization' of the workforce that comes with radically part-time post-productivist arrangements actually suits the needs of a post-modern service economy.

[Table omitted]

[Graph omitted]

[Graph omitted]

[Graph omitted]

[Graph omitted]

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